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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) (Supp 1993), which grants this court 
original appellate jurisdiction over appeals from "orders on 
petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons." Appellant Lettig was originally convicted 
second degree felony; therefore, this Court has jurisdiction. 
1 
ISSUE3 PRESENTED FOR RJEVXEW 
1. Did the trial court apply the correct standard of 
review in it's examination of the Board's actions. 
2. Did the Board provide sufficient portions of 
Petitioner's file to him, pursuant to Labrum, to enable Petitioner 
to adequately present his case to the Board, and make the 
appropriate corrections or clarifications. 
3. Did the three Board members who determined 
Petitioner's rehearing date, have sufficient accurate documentation 
to justify a 1996 rehearing. 
4. Did the Board abuse it's discretion, exceed it's 
jurisdiction or fail to perform a duty as required by law. 
5. Did the Board violate Petitioner's Due Process rights 
under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The choice of a standard of review, for all issues raised, is 
a legal conclusion that this Court can review for correctness. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (utah 1994); State v. Warden. 813 
P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991). 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) (Supp 1993) 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 2, 1993, Petitioner filed this petition for 
extraordinary Writ, challenging the actions and decisions of the 
Board. Lettig claimed that the Board had deprived him of his 
liberty by revoking his parole and ordering a rehearing for 
September 1996, without adequate explanation of it's reason or 
denying parole and exceeding the guidelines. Lettig claimed that 
the guidelines created an expectation of parole, or liberty 
interest, under Utah law which is protected under the due process 
clctuses of both the state and federal constitutions that the Board 
violated his rights by exceeding those guidelines. 
On December 14, 1993, at a hearing, the Court ordered that the 
Board grant petitioner a parole hearing and access to his parole 
file in accordance with the Labrum decision. Subsequently, the 
Board provided Petitioner an inadequate and incomplete copy of it's 
parole file. 
A new hearing before the Board took place January 19, 1994. 
The result of the new hearing was that the Board ordered an 
additional requirement, a psychological exam of the Petitioner, 
prior to any reappearance before the Board. Such an order was 
retaliatory in nature, without adequate support or explanation. 
An Evidentiary Hearing was held on April 18, 1994, before 
Judge David S. Young. At the Evidentiary Hearing, the Board 
submitted Petitioner's entire Board "file" into evidence. 
Petitioner submitted into evidence his copy of the material 
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provided to him, pursuant to the Labrum decision, in compliance 
with the order of Judge Young. It was only after examining the 
entire Board file, (submitted as an Exhibit) that the inaccurate 
information upon which the decision to grant a 1996 rehearing, was 
discovered. 
Apparently, the Board based their "final" decision on 
inaccurate information as follows: 
a. The inaccurate "fact" that this was Petitioner's "sixth" 
parole violation. In truth was, that it was only the fourth. 
b. The inaccurate "fact" that Petitioner placed "many 
other citizens" life in peril, when he was arrested for Failure To 
Stop At Officer's Command. This "fact" was a blatant exaggeration 
of the truth, which was never supported by any information or 
report. 
Petitioner has long felt that he has been the subject of 
retaliatory animus on the part of the Board, and was not able to 
confirm such a belief, until he was afforded the opportunity to 
examine his entire Board file, which was submitted as an exhibit at 
the Evidentiary Hearing. The file provided to Petitioner differed 
from the information available in the Petitioner's entire file, 
which was placed into evidence at the Evidentiary Hearing. The 
entire Board file contains references to the Petitioner as a 
"sniveler", and exhibits a personal disregard for the Petitioner, 
without benefit of any rationale. In fact, Board's members Don 
Blanchard and Heather Cook stated on 2-13-92, "...could someone 
please tell [Defendant] to quit sniveling!" See addendum C. 
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At the Evidentiary hearing, the testimony of Mr. Garner 
indicates that while Mr. Garner could remember little else about 
Lettig (he did not remember the actual number of previous paroles, 
the mitigating circumstances) he did recall that he had discounted 
Mr. Lettig's expression of remorse, without explanation or 
rationale. Such selective application of an expression by an inmate 
demonstrates a pattern of bias, prejudice and unequal treatment. 
It was Don Blanchard who, on July 21, 1993, made the 
recommendation to change Petitioner's rehearing date to September, 
1996. The same Don Blanchard who one year prior had labeled Lettig 
a "sniveler" in his permanent file, and the same Don Blanchard who 
caused Mr. Garner to be aware of little else at the evidentiary 
hearing, except the fact that he totally discounted Lettig7s 
remorse and in fact used Lettig7s expression of remorse as a factor 
to weigh heavily against Lettig in conducting the parole hearing 
for Lettig, in January, 1994. 
The trial court found that the Petitioner failed to prove any 
wrongful conduct by the Board in this case, and concluded that the 
Petitioner's case was without merit and should be dismissed. 
However, the trial court failed to examine the Petitioner's entire 
Board file, and compare it to the information which was made 
available to the Petitioner (by the Board), and failed to note that 
the testimony of Mr. Garner was not supported by the documentation 
in the file. 
5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 10, 1992 Appellant Lettig was released from the 
Utah State Prison under a parole agreement signed by the Utah 
Board of Pardons and Parole (hereinafter "Board"). 
On June 4, 1994, Lettig was brought back to the Utah State 
Prison and incarcerated, after he plead guilty to a third degree 
felony, Failure To Stop At Officer's Command, by Judge Frank G. 
Noel. Lettig was also incarcerated with several technical parole 
violations; removal of personal ISP monitoring device and failure 
to maintain record of residence while on parole. 
On July 21, 1993, Petitioner appeared before a single-member 
panel of the Board, for a parole revocation hearing. The single-
member was Fred Trujillo, who exhibited such prejudice toward 
Petitioner, as to comment on the record that the police (in 
Petitioner's third degree felony conviction) should have "taken a 
more permanent solution" to the Petitioner's case. 
Mr. Trujillo issued an interim decision revoking Petitioner's 
parole and ordering that Petitioner's case be scheduled for a 
rehearing in September of 1995, to consider the next possible 
parole date. No actual parole date was given. 
On or about July 26, 1993, the Board came together at a 
meeting and considered Petitioner's case and the interim decision 
of July 21, 1993, and modified the September, 1995 date. A new 
rehearing date of September, 1996 was set. Petitioner was not 
present at that meeting and no new evidence or testimony was taken 
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or considered by the Board. The Rehearing date exceeded the 
guidelines, and no adequate, and accurate, explanation has ever 
been provided to Lettig. 
On November 2, 1993 Lettig filed a Petition For Extraordinary 
Relief. Lettig claimed that the Board had deprived him of his 
liberty by revoking his parole and ordering a rehearing for 
September of 1996 without an adequate explanation of its reasons 
lor denying parole and exceeding the guidelines, and without 
adequate access to his file which the Board used to make a final 
determination. 
On December 14, 1993, the case came before the trial court for 
a scheduled evidentiary hearing to resolve the issues pending. At 
that time the trial court ordered that Lettig should be permitted 
to examine his file, pursuant to Labrum v. Utah Board of Pardons, 
and that the Board should conduct a new parole hearing for Lettig, 
for the purposes of considering Lettig's parole date. 
The Board provided Lettig a partial copy of his file, and a 
hearing was held on January 19, 1994, in accordance with the 
court's order. On March 7, 1994 the Appellant requested to amend 
his complaint and the request was granted, and the amended petition 
was filed with the court. 
An evidentiary hearing was held on the Petition for 
extraordinary relief on April 18, 1994. The actual information upon 
which the Board based their "modified" decision was inaccurate, 
and Petitioner was unaware of the inaccuracy - until the Board 
submitted the Petitioner's entire file into evidence as an exhibit, 
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at the Evidentiary (hearing held April 18, 1994) before Judge 
Young. 
Some of the inaccuracies discovered were not included in the 
information in the Petitioner's file which the court ordered the 
Board to provide to the Petitioner. In addition, Mr. Garner 
testified that the decision of the Board was based upon prior 
convictions, the number of previous paroles (which was an error in 
Lettig's file) and Lettig's "lack of remorse at the parole 
hearings". In fact, there is documentation in Lettig's file to 
indicate that Mr. Lettig was very remorseful, in fact historically 
he did express remorse, and was never arrogant or defiant. 
The Court found that it was convinced by Mr. Garner's 
testimony. However, the finding of the court are not supported by 
Mr. Garner's testimony, and are in direct opposition with Mr. 
Garner's testimony. Additionally the findings of the court do not 
indicate that the court examined the exhibits (entire Board file of 
Lettig, tapes of the hearings, etc). 
Although the court did examine the entire Board file enough to 
note Lettig was paroled four times in the past twenty (20) years, 
and not six (as Mr. Garner and Mr. Trujillo had stated at Lettig's 
parole hearings) the court failed to examine the file enough to 
reach a determination as to the other inaccuracies, and prejudicial 
statements found in the file. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not apply the correct standard of review 
in it's examination of the Board's actions. 
The Board of Pardons did not provide sufficient portions of 
Petitioner's file to him, pursuant to Labrum, to enable Lettig to 
adequately present his case to the Board, and make the appropriate 
corrections or clarifications, or explanations. The actual file 
reveals that the decision of the Board of Pardons was based upon 
inaccurate information, and a general prejudice to Appellant 
Lettig, so egregious that it constitutes a violation of Lettig's 
Due Process rights under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The three Board members who determined Petitioner's rehearing 
date, did not have sufficient accurate documentation to justify a 
1996 rehearing, and comments contained in the file, which were made 
by Don Blanchard and Heather Cook, regarding the fact that they 
considered lettig a "sniveler", were so inappropriate as to render 
the remaining Board members incapable of a just and fair 
determination. In fact, the one item of information Mr. Garner was 
able to testify to (without looking at the file) was that he 
recalled that Mr. Lettig had expressed "appropriate remorse", but 
decided to discount the expression of remorse, without reason, 
explanation or justification. 
The Board of Pardons abused it's discretion, and exceed it's 
jurisdiction by failing to perform their duties as required by 
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law, and the trial court failed to properly examine Lettig's 
claim's in that regard, or the evidence presented to support 
Lettig's claim. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY REVIEW EVIDENCE BEFORE THE 
BOARD OF PARDONS, THUS THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DEFERRED 
TO THE BOARD• THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT MUST BE VACATED. 
Appellant Lettig requested that the trial court conduct a 
review of the Board7s revocation proceeding and that was done in 
the evidentiary hearing held on April 18, 1994. In substance, 
Lettig's rule 65B petition request was a request for an appellate 
review of the Board. In re Discharge of JonesP 720 P.2d 1356, 1360 
(Utah 1986); Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas and Mining, 765P 
2d. 1135, 1139-1140 (Utah 1983) Erkman v. Civil Service Comm'n, 198 
P2d 238, 240 (Utah 1948); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 
P. 2d 23, 26 (Utah App. 1991); Vali Convalescent and Care Inst., v. 
Dep't of Health, 797 P.2d 438m 443-44 (Utah App. 1988; see also 
Craig v. State, 844 P.2d 1371, 1373, (Idaho App. 1992); (appeal of 
district court decision affirming parole commission revocation; In 
re Appeal of Banks, 630 P.2d 1131, 1133-34 (Kan. 1981) (appeal of 
administrative decision not to build health facility). 
Due to the nature of the appeal, the court should have 
examined the evidence upon which the Board relied and examined said 
evidence for clear error. Norman H. Jackson, 7 Utah Standards of 
Appellate Review 9, 13 (1994); Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 
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1282, 1287 (Utah 1993); Kennecott Crop, v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 
P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993). Not only did the trial court fail to 
examine the evidence Lettig marshalled, but the evidence the Board 
supplied was never examined for inaccuracy or due process 
violations. 
The trial court's resulting obligation (at the evidentiary 
hearing) was to examine the evidence marshalled and examine the 
board's findings, and the evidence upon which the Board based their 
findings, and make a determination as to whether or not the 
decision was based upon correct and appropriate information, or 
simply the opinion of the Board that Lettig was a "sniveler" who 
did not deserve a parole. 
The Board never revealed the real reasons for denying Lettig 
a parole date. The Board's own rules require that an "explanation 
of the reason for [a] decision [be] given and support in writing." 
Utah Admin. R. 671-305-2 (1992). When the Board failed to provide 
the actual basis upon which the decision that Lettig should be 
given a 1996 rehearing date. 
The trial court's findings of Fact, Number 40, found that the 
decision not to set a parole date for Lettig was based, in part 
upon "Petitioner's lack of remorse at the parole hearings". 
However, Lettig's file contains a Board Action Routing Sheet, 
Parole Violation Hearing, dated July 21, 1993, which states "The 
subject did display remorse for his actions ". See addendum 
B. In addition, Mr. Garner's testimony was not that the Petitioner 
Lettig displayed a "lack of remorse", as the trial court's Findings 
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of Fact, Number 40 stated, but, the testimony of Mr. Garner was 
that Lettig had "five or six or seven" previous paroles (When in 
fact, he had four) and: 
"....at prior hearings [Lettig] displayed himself well, and 
displayed appropriate remorse and so forth and as a result I think 
I, as the person conducting the Hearing this time, tended to 
discount those things at the hearing". 
Q. Tended to Discount what? 
A. His expressions of remorse, expression of intentions to do 
better from here on out. 
Q. I am a little confused. So your testimony is that even 
though he displayed remorse and appropriate affect you discounted 
that display? 
A. Correct". 
(T. at 27) 
There simply was not testimony by Mr. Garner's at the 
evidentiary hearing, that Lettig was "not remorseful" and the trial 
court's finding's in that regard improperly supported the Board's 
actions. Appellant Lettig is unable to defend or overcome such 
findings by the trial court. 
The testimony contradicts the findings. In short, there is 
simply no rationale or explanation for the Board's actions, which 
can be supported by either testimony or documentation, and the 
trial courts' findings are in error. 
The trial Court erred when it did not consider or examine the 
fact that any remorseful or contrite statement's made by Lettig may 
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have been considered "sniveling" by Mr. Garner, and in fact he was 
punished (by refusing to follow the Utah Sentence and Release 
Guidelines) for making any comments relative to his remorse. The 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are erroneous 
and demonstrate a lack of determination to find out the actual 
basis upon which the Board made their decisions regarding Appellant 
Lettig. 
Mr. Garner also testified that even though Mr. Lettig has only 
been paroled three times on his current conviction in 1988, he 
considered negatively the fact that Mr. Lettig had been paroled on 
another expired sentence. (T. at 55). 
Also Mr. Alan R. Walker testified at the evidentiary hearing. 
Mr. Walker prepared the report upon which the Board members based 
their decision. The testimony of Mr. Walker was that he prepared 
the worksheets for parole violations hearings. (T at 107). Mr. 
Walker's report was greatly exaggerated and contained inaccurate 
statements. Mr. Walker's report states that Mr. Lettig "endangered 
the lives of countless numbers of people in his attempt to escape". 
(T at 115). In fact, Mr. Lettig was not the driver of the car, but 
a passenger. An unarmed passenger. The "weapon" which the report 
refers to is the car itself. There was no documentation submitted 
to Mr. Lettig which supported Mr. Walker's baseless statements. 
Mr. Walker also testified that his report indicated that Mr. 
Lettig had six prior paroles. The Findings of Fact, issued by the 
trial court determine that was not accurate. ( T at 116) 
Although the trial court did note at Finding of Fact number 5, 
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at page 2, that there had not been six previous paroles, but four. 
The Findings of Fact did not address at any point the fact that the 
Board of Pardons based their decisions on a misleading and 
inaccurate report, made by Mr. Walker. However, Mr. Garner did 
testify that when Mr. Lettig's counsel attempted to clarify the 
situation Mr. Garner consider that to be denial or minimizing the 
situation. 
If the purpose of Labrum, was to allow for correction and 
clarification, and the Board member holds the correction process 
against the inmate seeking parole, then the notion of due possess 
has been completely abandoned. The result of Mr. Lettig's attempt 
to clarify and correct, through both the Board process and the 
court system, has been that (without being present at the hearing) 
the Board, on it's own initiative, extended his rehearing date 
another year in the future. The only occupance, or cause, known to 
Mr. Lettig is his singular attempt to seek fair treatment. The 
signal or message from the Board is clear, if an inmate seeks to 
correct or clarify, the Board punishes them and labels the 
punishment it's "right" under the Utah indeterminate sentencing 
system. Such behavior is a blatant violation of due process. 
Mr. Lettig marshalled evidence for the trial court that 
demonstrated clear error on the part of the Board. The trial 
court's resulting obligation was then to reject the Board's 
findings as incorrect. Crockett v. Crockettr 836 P.2d 818, 820 
(Utah App. 1992) (because of failure to marshal evidence, appellate 
court assumes record support findings), and also by "elementary 
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principles of appellate review," Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607, 
608 (Utah 1976) (in the absence of a record, findings are presumed 
to have been supported by admissible, competent and substantial 
evidence) Appellant Lettig demonstrated to the trial court that 
the Board's findings could not be supported by the record in his 
file and the testimony of Mr. Garner was that he based his decision 
in inaccurate information and discounted Mr. Lettig's remorse. 
Dased upon the evidence, the decision of the Board could not be 
supported by "admissible competent and substantial evidence" .Id. at 
607. 
In Ward v. Smith, the court adopted a standard of deference to 
Board decisions but held that if there exists "a clear abuse of 
rightful discretion" the Board results could be overturned. 
Ward v. Smith. 573 p. 2d 781, 782 (Utah 1978). When Mr. Garner 
refused to accept a statement of remorse, and counted it against 
Mr. Lettig, when Mr. Garner was not even aware of the actual number 
of previous paroles, and held an inaccurate number against Lettig, 
and when the Board unilaterally imposed an additional year, without 
hearing, Lettig's presence, and no event other than Lettig's 
attempt to gain access to the court system, via the Writ process, 
the Board went way beyond their boundaries and abused their 
"rightful discretion". 
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THE BOARD DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PORTIONS OF 
APPELLANT'S FILE TO HIM TO ENABLE LETTIG TO ADEQUATELY 
PRESENT HIS CASE# TO EITHER THE BOARD OR THE TRIAL COURT. 
NEITHER THE BOARD NOR THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE 
INACCURACIES OR THE PREJUDICE EXHIBITED, IN THE FILE, 
TOWARD THE APPELLANT BY THE BOARD, THUS VIOLATING 
LETTIG'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
The Board's counsel placed Lettig's entire file into evidence, 
at the evidentiary hearing. At no time prior to the evidentiary 
was Lettig ever able to examine his entire file. Neither Lettig 
nor his counsel were provided adequate access to the file during 
the evidentiary hearing, sufficient to examine the file and compare 
the file to the "copy" Lettig had received. While the Board could 
have simply placed a copy of what was given to Lettig into 
evidence, they opted to place the entire, original file into 
evidence. Thus, Lettig is now entitled to examine the exhibit and 
determine if anything exists in the Board's file which can possibly 
explain the Board's prejudicial treatment of Lettig. 
The Findings of Fact issued by the trial court do not indicate 
that the trial court made a thorough examination of Lettig's file, 
nor indicate the trial court had examined each exhibit, nor 
mention that the portions of the file provided to Lettig differ 
considerably, in content, from that which was supplied to Lettig. 
In Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909, the Supreme Court of the state of Utah 
made a determine that supported the due process rights established 
in the Utah Constitution, Article 1, § 7, and stated that due 
process "requires that the inmate know what information the Board 
will be considering at the [original parole grant] hearing] and 
that the inmate know soon enough in advance to have a reasonable 
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opportunity to prepare responses and rebuttal of inaccuracies". 
Labrum further held that the rule applied "to any inmate who 
currently had a claim pending in the district court or on appeal 
before this court or the court of appeals challenging original 
parole grant hearing procedures on due process grounds." Id at 914. 
Therefore, the Board abused it's discretion, and exceeded it's 
jurisdiction when they failed to perform their duties's as set 
forth in Labrum. Additionally, the trial court not only failed to 
take note of the Board's inadequate performance with Lettig, the 
trial court simply rubber stamped the Board's performance, made 
Findings of Fact which cannot be supported by testimony. 
While the trial court's Finding's of Fact and Conclusions of 
law, #32, at page 7, acknowledged that the trial court had ordered, 
and the Board subsequently provided Lettig with a copy of his 
parole file, in accordance with Labrum, the findings do not 
indicate that the trial court examined the "copy" of Lettig's file 
which was placed into evidence by Lettig, and compared it with the 
"original" file placed into evidence by the Board. It was only 
through such a comparison, after the evidentiary hearing, that 
Lettig's counsel was able to discover that inaccuracies still 
remained, corrections had not been made, and that Lettig's original 
file had sections (unavailable, and unknown to Lettig) had labeled 
Mr. Lettig as a "sniveler". Such remarks and covert communications 
between Board members appear to be the actual basis upon which 
Lettig's parole status was determined. It appears to be the basis 
upon which Mr. Garner discounted entirely Mr. Lettig's remorse and 
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refused to even consider the fact that Mr. Lettig appeared to be 
remorseful. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Court vacate the 
trial court's order and order that Appellant be granted a new 
parole hearing in which accurate information is considered and 
further that the Board be instructed to make a fair, impartial 
determination, which is supported by competent, accurate, and 
substantial evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 3rd day of February, 1995. 
tosemona ~-e±axelock 
attorney for Appellant 
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The above-entitled matter came before this Court on April 18, 
1994, for an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's Petition for 
extraordinary relief- The Respondents were represented by Lorenzo 
K. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, and Petitioner was present 
and represented by Rosemond G. Blakelock. The Court having taken 
testimony and evidence in this case, having been fully briefed by 
the parties, having carefully considered the facts and evidence of 
this case, and having heard the arguments, issued its final 
judgment. Based upon the above, the Court now makes the following 
findings: 
giqp;PT(?S p? FACT 
1. Petitioner William M. Lettig is presently incarcerated at 
the Utah State Prison and serving two valid indeterminate sentences 
of imprisonment: the first for Theft, a second degree felony, and 
the second for Evading Arrest\Failure to Stop, a third degree 
felony• 
2. Prior to the sentences Petitioner is now serving, 
Petitioner was also serving sentences for the crimes of Carrying a 
Concealed & Dangerous Weapon, a third degree felony, Attempted 
Escape from Custody, a third degree felony, two separate charges of 
Attempted Robbery, a third degree felony, and Reckless Driving, a 
misdemeanor. 
3. On November 10, 1992, Petitioner was released from the 
Utah State Prison under a parole agreement signed by the Utah Board 
of Pardons and Parole (hereinafter "Board"). 
4. As a condition of that parole, Petitioner agreed to abide 
by all the terms and conditions of the parole agreement as set by 
the Board, including obedience to federal, state and local laws. 
5. This was Petitioner's fourth parole from the prison since 
his initial incarceration in December 1975; all prior paroles ended 
in revocation because Petitioner failed to abide by the parole 
agreements and continued criminal activity and misbehavior while on 
parole. 
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6. On July 21, 1993, Petitioner appeared before a single-
member panel of the Board for a fourth parole revocation hearing• 
7. Petitioner was represented by counsel at that time, and 
counsel participated throughout the revocation proceedings before 
the Board. 
8. At the hearing, Petitioner pled "guilty" to having 
violated four separate conditions of his parole agreement, 
including having been convicted of a new felony offense while on 
parole; Petitioner also pled "no contest" to a fifth parole 
violation allegation. 
9. Petitioner's counsel did not object to the Board's actions 
while conducting the hearing, and Petitioner submitted the case for 
the Board's final decision regarding revocation. 
10. The board member conducting the hearing issued an interim 
decision revoking Petitioner's parole and ordering that Petitioner 
be re-incarcerated at the prison based upon Petitioner's guilty 
pleas. 
11. Instead of giving Petitioner another parole date, the 
board member ordered that Petitioner's case be scheduled for 
rehearing in September of 1995 to consider the next possible parole 
date. 
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12. In addition to the above order, the board member issued 
a written rationale for his decision, and that rationale contained 
the reasons for giving a 1995 rehearing date. 
13. On August 3f 1993, the full Board came together at a 
regularly scheduled meeting and considered Petitioner's case and 
the interim decision of July 21, 1993. 
14. At that time, the Board adopted the interim decision to 
revoke Petitioner's parole date and to re-incarcerate him, but it 
modified the 1995 rehearing dated to be 1996. 
15% Petitioner was not present at that meeting, and no new 
evidence or testimony was taken or considered by the Board at that 
time. 
16. On November 2, 1993, Petitioner filed a petition for 
extraordinary relief, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(c) and (e) 
(1993), challenging the actions and decisions of the Board. 
17. In that petition, Petitioner claimed that the Board had 
deprived him of his liberty by revoking his parole and ordering a 
rehearing for September of 1996 without an adequate explanation of 
its reasons for "denying parole and exceeding guidelines." 
18. Petitioner asserted that by exceeding the guidelines, the 
Board violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the 
United States Constitution and the analogous clause of the state 
constitution. 
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19. Petitioner also claimed that the guidelines created an 
expectation of parole (or liberty interest) under Utah law which is 
protected under the due process clauses of both the state and 
federal constitutions and that the Board violated his rights by 
exceeding those guidelines. 
20. Petitioner also claimed that the Board failed to allow 
Petitioner the right to present evidence in his behalf and that it 
failed to accept evidence in his favor at the parole revocation 
hearing. 
21. Petitioner also challenged the ultimate decision of the 
Board to grant him a 1996 rehearing; he did not claim that the 
Board had failed to provide him access to the Board's files or the 
information considered at the hearing. 
22. Petitioner requested that the court order "respondents to 
rehear petitioner's case and grant him parole within the stated 
Guidelines." 
23. On December 14, 1993, the case came before the court for 
a scheduled evidentiary hearing to resolve the issues pending 
before the court. 
24. At that hearing, Petitioner had no witnesses to call but 
instead offered a statement to the court raising issues that had 
never been raised and were not part of the record. 
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25. Petitioner did not refute the facts put forth by the 
Board but argued that the case of Labrum v. Utah Board of Pardons, 
227 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah, Dec. 6, 1993), applied to his case and 
dhould be considered by the court. 
26. Prior to that date, the Labrum case was not in issue and 
was not briefed by the parties. 
27. Based upon discussion with the parties, the court 
concluded that Petitioner was entitled to a parole hearing on the 
new criminal conviction leading to the parole revocation hearing 
and Petitioner's recommitment. 
28. The court also concluded that the Labrum protections 
should be applied to that new hearing. 
29. The court ordered the Board to grant Petitioner a parole 
hearing to consider the possibility of a future parole date on the 
new conviction and to grant Petitioner access to his parole file in 
accordance with the Labrum decision. 
30. The court stated that the new hearing was not intended to 
affect Petitioner's prior guilty pleas before the Board or to 
modify the Board's determination to revoke Petitioner's previous 
parole date. 
31. The court's stated intention was that the Board hold an 
original parole-grant hearing (on Petitioner's new conviction) and 
to consider a possible early release date for that conviction. 
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32. Subsequently, the Board provided Petitioner a copy of its 
parole file, in accordance with its interpretation of the Labrum 
decision, and it reheard Petitioner's case. 
33. The new hearing took place on January 19, 1994, in 
accordance with the court's order, the stipulations of the parties, 
and R671 of the Utah Administrative Code (1993) . 
34. Petitioner was present at the hearing and represented by 
his own counsel, Rosemond Blakelock. 
35. On March 7, 1994, this matter again came before the 
court, and Petitioner requested to amend his complaint against the 
Board. 
36. The Court granted Petitioner's motion to amend, over 
Respondents' objection, and ordered that the amended petition be 
filed on March 18, 1994. 
37. Respondents were ordered to file an answer to the amended 
petition by April 1, 1994, and the case was set for an evidentiary 
hearing to be conducted on April 18, 1994. 
38. On April 18, 1994, an evidentiary hearing was held in 
this matter, and at that time, the court heard testimony from 
numerous witnesses regarding the Board's procedural processes and 
actions in Petitioner's case. 
39. Curtis Garner, the board member who conducted the January 
1994 hearing, testified that the sentencing matrix contained in the 
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Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines is used to calculate minimum 
sentence terms and that numerous other factors must also be 
considered when setting a parole date. 
40. Mr. Garner testified that Board's decisions in this case 
were affected by Petitioner's prior convictions, the number of 
previous paroles and Petitioner's lack of remorse at the parole 
hearings. 
41. Mr. Garner testified that the Board routinely deviates 
from the guidelines and that the guidelines are only one of many 
factors used by the Board in determining an early-release date. 
42. Mr. Garner also testified that the Board does not feel 
bound by the guidelines but merely considers the guidelines as a 
recommendation, not the actual sentence of imprisonment. 
43. Witness James Furner, a parole officer for Adult 
Probation and Parole, testified that he never told Petitioner that 
he [Mr. Furner] intended to see Petitioner serve every year of his 
sentence. 
44. Mr. Furner also denied Petitioner's allegations of 
altering the condition of any weapons taken from Petitioner's home 
during or of any other improprieties in the supervision of 
Petitioner's case. 
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45. The court finds that Mr. Garner and Mr. Furner's 
testimonies were convincing, and that they did not demonstrate any 
animosity or bias toward Petitioner as alleged in the complaint. 
46. The court also finds that Petitioner has failed to prove 
that the Board acted inappropriately in this matter. 
47. The Board's entire records on Petitioner was introduced 
as an exhibit, and those records indicate that Petitioner has been 
paroled from his sentence of incarceration on at least four 
separate occasions. 
48. Petitioner testified that he did not dispute the fact 
that he violated his parole in this case or that the Board was 
authorized to revoke his parole based upon the five violations of 
the parole agreement. 
49. When asked what proceedings the Board could give him to 
make the hearing in his case more fair, Petitioner referred to the 
guidelines but did not identify any additional procedural 
protections that should be afforded by the Board. 
50. Accordingly, the court finds that Petitioner's claims in 
this case go directly against the substance of the Board's ultimate 
parole decision, attacking the Board's ability to deviate from the 
guidelines in his case, not against the procedural protections 
afforded by the Board. Based upon the above findings of fact, the 
court now makes the following conclusions: 
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CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
Petitioner has failed to prove that the Board failed to 
perform an act required by law or that the Board has exceeded it 
jurisdiction or abused its discretion in this case. Indeed the 
records of the Board show that the Board acted within its authority 
under state and federal law and properly applied the guidelines in 
Petitioner's case. 
The court also concludes that the Board had adequate cause and 
justification to revoke Petitioner's parole, based upon his 
admitted violations of the parole agreement, and to deny him a 
parole date on the new crime of commitment, regardless of the 
guideline matrix. 
Furthermore, the court concludes that Petitioner failed to 
establish that the Board violated his procedural due process rights 
under either state or federal law. The guidelines contained in the 
Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines are used as a tool to 
calculate minimum release dates, and the Board had sufficient cause 
in this case to exceed those guidelines based upon Petitioner's 
prior paroles and the other circumstances of his case that were 
identified by the Board in its written rationale. 
Furthermore, the court concludes that Petitioner has failed to 
prove or even establish that the Board has abused its discretion, 
exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform a duty required by 
10 
law. Additionally, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a basis 
that would entitle him to the judicial relief requested in his 
amended petition. 
Based upon the above and the fact that Petitioner has failed 
to prove any wrongful conduct by the Respondents in this case, the 
court concludes that Petitioner's claims against the Respondents 
are without merit and should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
Having made the foregoing findings and conclusions, the court 
makes the following order: 
FINAL ORDER 
1. Respondents' motion for judgment is hereby granted. 
2. The relief Petitioner seeks in his amended petition is 
denied as a matter of law. 
3. This case is dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Respondents' motion to seal the Board of Pardons' file 
and records from public disclosure is hereby denied. 
5. Respondents' counsel (in the presence of Petitioner's 
counsel or representative) is hereby granted permission 
of the court to take the Board of Pardons' file, which 
was admitted as evidence, from the court for the sole 
purpose of making a copy of that record. Upon completion 
of copying, the file shall be immediately returned to the 
court in its original condition and organization. 
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•Ir^ky Dated this "^ 'fr^ a'a of May, 1994. 
BY THE COURT,;; 
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ay of May, 1994, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, an exact copy of the attached 
(proposed and unsigned) Findings, Conclusions and Final Order to: 
ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER 
37 EAST CENTER #200 
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IE: William Lettig 
E: 7/21/93 
BOARD ACTION ROUTING SHEET 
PAROLE VIOLATION HEARING 
USP # 13684 
/ 
MARY 
current matter represents the offender's sixth parole violation. It is very 
cerning to note that not only did Mr. Lettig abscond supervision, he was also 
/icted of a new Third Degree Felony, Failure to Stop at an Officer's Command; the 
ielines of which amount to 24 months. This new conviction is especially aggravated 
to the fact that Lettig placed the officer's life in peril, as well as many other 
Lzens. (please refer to the attached info.). Based upon the totality of this 
lation, the DOC has recommended a five year rehearing. The subject did display 
>rse for his actions and did plead for a parole date, however, because this H.O. is of 
opinion that Lettig needs time to prove himself, a rehearing, but of a lessor amount 
ime will be suggested. 
MMENDATION: 
efore, my interim decision was to revoke the previous parole date of 11/10/92, and to 
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